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1. Introduction 
 A key component of a well functioning corporate governance system is the 
bankruptcy law and related insolvency procedures.  Banks will not lend if they 
cannot retrieve their money from recalcitrant borrowers, and the costs and 
procedures for dealing with borrowers in distress will influence banks behavior 
towards borrowers. Many developing and emerging market economies have 
insolvency law “on the books”, but few have procedures and courts that enforce the 
laws. If enforcement of debt contracts is weak while banks have effective 
governance the supply of credit tends to be severely curtailed. Alternatively, 
banking systems may lend based on criteria determi ned by relations or politics.  
       In this paper we evaluate the insolvency procedures in Croatia, Estonia, and 
Poland using a questionnaire that was sent to managers of foreign owned banks in 
the three countries. The managers responded to questions about their perceptions of 
formal and informal aspects of insolvency procedures, and of the impact on these 
procedures on the banks’ credit policies. Foreign owned banks are used as 
respondents because managers of these banks have experience of insolvency 
procedures in the banks’ home countries. Therefore they have a reference point 
when answering our questions. 
          Before presenting the perceptions of bankers we review the role of 
insolvency procedures in an economic growth and crises in Section 2. The 
variation in formal insolvency law across countries is described in Section 3, where 
insolvency law is also classified in different ways. Most often laws are classified as 
more or less creditor-or debtor oriented. A more interesting classification from an 
economic point of view is the extent to which it recognizes and enforces 
voluntarily entered contracts. The practical implementation of insolvency law and 
its contribution to restructuring in different countries is discussed in Section 4. 
Enforcement of law is identified as a particular weakness of insolvency regimes in 
most developing countries and many emerging market economies 
   We turn to the questions and responses in Section 5.  Thereafter, in Section 6, 
we analyze which aspects of the insolvency procedures in the three countries seem 
to be most important for banks’ credit policies. In Section 7 we present a few 
stylized facts about credit markets in the three counties as evidence of the impact 
of differences in insolvency procedures. 
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2. The Role of Insolvency law and Procedures1 
“Bankruptcy is a collective procedure for the recovery of debts by creditors.  It also 
protects individuals who have become overburdened by their debts.” (Wood, 1995 
Preface) 
 
This quote summarizes well the role of bankruptcy law including laws for 
restructuring such as Chapter 11 in the U.S.A.  There is a potential benefit to both 
creditors and debtors in bankruptcy.  Creditors wish to recover debts to the extent 
possible in a speedy manner from a borrower who is unable to pay all creditors fully. 
From the borrower’s point of view, bankruptcy should allow the speedy resolution of 
debts.  Thereafter, the borrower can devote his or her human and other remaining 
resources to new ventures.  The assets employed in the firm can similarly be 
reallocated to projects with positive value. 
       In Table 1, a distinction is made between “economic distress” and “financial 
distress.”  In “economic distress” the net present value of a firm’s assets are negative 
and from a financial valuation point of view, the firm should be shut down in its 
present form.  It is possible, however, that physical assets under different management 
would produce a positive net present value.  If so, it would be efficient to auction or 
sell the firm as a “going concern” to new owners that would be able to improve 
management. Under “financial distress,” the net present value of the assets is positive 
but the value of debts exceeds the present value of the cash flows generated by the 
assets. Thus, in financial distress a firm is insolvent but its assets produce a positive 
value from a social point of view.  In this case, debt-reduction and rehabilitation, 
possibly in combination with more fundamental restructuring, such as change in 
control, would be efficient.  
      A firm may find itself in financial distress also because of liquidity constraints 
even if the present value of cash flows from assets exceeds the debts. This situation 
presumes that the financial system for one reason or another fails in its role of 
providing liquidity to solvent firms. The obvious remedy is rescheduling of debt, or 
liquidity infusion. 
                               
1 This section is based on Wihlborg and Gangopadhyay (2001) 
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          Insolvency procedures, should not only resolve a distress situation but the 
resolution should be accomplished at the lowest possible costs. Several studies show 
that direct and indirect bankruptcy costs in the USA are substantial. They vary across 
industries and depend on, for example, predictability and duration of procedures.2  
 
 
Table 1. Types of distress and efficient action at the time of distress (ex 
post efficiency) 
 Definition Efficient action 
The net present value of  assets is 
negative under any management 
team 
Piecemeal liquidation of assets Economic distress 
  
The net present value of assets is 
positive under a different 
management team  
Sale of assets as a “going concern” 
to enable a change of management  
The present value of cash flows is 
positive but it is lower than the 
value of claims by non- 
shareholders  
Debt reduction in combination with 
restructuring and/or ownership 
change, if value of assets thereby 
can be enhanced 
Financial distress  
Liquidity-problem                                   Debt-rescheduling,                                                                                                        
Liquidity-enhancement 
 
 
         Insolvency procedures provide only one way to restructure an economy where 
assets need to be reallocated continuously in response to changes in preferences, 
technology and human skill. Mergers and acquisitions, internal restructuring within 
conglomerates, and voluntary closings of firms with associated asset sales offer 
alternatives in the restructuring process. Thus, insolvency procedures should be seen 
in the larger context of their contribution to restructuring.   
            The procedures can be the cause of a crisis if disincentives for bankruptcy in 
combination with a politically influenced banking system, and state support of banks 
and firms contribute to an accumulation of surviving, economically distressed firms. 
The disincentives for bankruptcy may be that proceedings are costly, and long drawn 
out with little likelihood for creditors to be paid in any case. 
                               
2 Direct bankruptcy costs are, for example, lawyers’ fees, while indirect costs may be caused by lost 
sales, or added costs of inputs in a distress-situation. See, for example, Altman (1984), Altman and 
Vanderhoof (1994) and Weiss (1997). 
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          An existing crisis may be deepened and prolonged if financially distressed firms 
are not rehabilitated but are forced to shut down. Similarly, a crisis is deepened, if 
liquidity problems cause the shut-down of operations in a credit crunch. Wide-spread 
financial distress in a country may be caused by a severe macro-economic shock, 
large exchange rate changes, or increases in interest rates. We certainly observed this 
type of deepening of a crisis in the hard hit Asian economies, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand (Hussain and Wihlborg, 1999) 
           There exists strong evidence that the lack of effective insolvency procedures 
can contribute to a banking-crisis, and the ability of banks to recover from a crisis. In 
a study by Caprio Jr and Klingebiel (1996) severe banking crises in 69 countries 
between 1980 and 1995 are recorded. Crises in 26 countries are studied in more detail 
with respect to their causes, and the resolution of crises. In a large share of the latter 
countries politically influenced lending practicies of banks were seen as a contributing 
cause of the crisis. An inefficient legal framework hindered the resolution of crises in 
many countries.3   
         It is easy to lay down the principle that if a firm’s assets generate a positive net 
present value, then they should continue in operation even if the firm is in distress. 
The difficulty of implementing procedures leading to “ex post efficiency” as defined 
above is substantial, because of differences in availability of information among 
managers, shareholders and various creditors, and because inherent conflicts of 
interest imply that all information is not voluntarily disclosed. As a result, an 
independent body with enforcement powers, such as a court, is required in order to 
come to a conclusion on the issues of restructuring vs. liquidation, and of control.   
The valuation of assets at the time of distress is extremely difficult to arrive at, 
however. To obtain any approximation of value it may be necessary to offer the assets 
for sale in different configurations.  Offering the assets for sale as a “going concern” 
or piecemeal implies that the alternative of rehabilitation including debt forgiveness 
with the present ownership is made possible.  If the present owner can make the 
highest bid in spite of distress will there be restructuring without change of control. 
(Such informal restructuring is not uncommon as we note below.) 
                               
3 Debt recovery was hampered by the legal system in the following heterogeneous group of countries 
outside Africa with recent banking crises: Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, and Hungary.  These 
observations indicate that a large number of countries with different legal traditions on all continents 
have insolvency procedures that contribute to or prolong economic crises. 
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         One reason why an incumbent owner may value a firm higher than others is that 
he or she may have “invested” in or acquired firm-specific human capital 
(knowledge).  Since this specific capital would be lost if the present owner would not 
be able to remain the owner after distress, he or she may value the firm as a going 
concern higher than others. 
         Not only the owner of a distressed firm may have invested in or acquired 
specific capital that would be lost if a firm were discontinued as a going concern. 
Many employees may have skills that would not provide any return if they want to 
work for other firms. Suppliers, customers, the surrounding community, the 
municipality and the state may also have strong interests in the continuation of the 
particular activity of a distressed firm.  
             Insolvency procedures affect economic incentives not only at the time of 
distress but also at the time various stakeholders enter contracts with a still healthy 
firm.  The expected resolution of distress will therefore affect the incentives of 
various stakeholders to invest in firm-specific assets.  Furthermore, the procedures 
affect the willingness of different groups of creditors to supply financing. Insolvency 
procedures that increase the likelihood of firm survival increase the incentives of 
various stakeholders to invest in firm-specific capital.  The same procedures would 
reduce the expected return on financing the firm, if survival is accomplished at the 
expense of the lenders.  As a result the costs of financing a healthy firm would 
increase. Uncertainty about procedures increases these costs further.  
           The issue of the ex ante efficient priority rule in bankruptcy remains 
unresolved even when a rather narrow range of specific assets is considered.  What 
can be said is that ex ante efficiency is enhanced if: 
1. Insolvency procedures are flexible enough to allow different types of resolutions 
for firms with different types of stakeholders. 
  2. Insolvency procedures are well defined ex ante.  In other words, the rules for 
dealing with insolvency should not be subject to uncertainty. 
3. Insolvency procedures allow speedy resolution of distress. 
         Viewing priority rules as one aspect of a firm’s ex ante contracts with different 
stakeholders, these points indicate that, from an economic efficiency point of view, 
rules should allow the different stakeholders to obtain the types of contract they find 
suitable. We return to implications of this view below. 
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3. Orientations of Insolvency Procedures across countries 
      It is common to denote insolvency procedures as either creditor-oriented or 
debtor-oriented. These terms indicate whether the procedures tend to favor creditors 
or debtors in terms of claims on the distressed firm’s assets, and in terms of control 
over these assets in and after legal proceedings for bankruptcy or restructuring. The 
existence of an easily accessible restructuring law generally favors debtors, since such 
a law—if it is mandatory-- implies that there is a constraint on the range of contractual 
solutions in distress situations. If incumbent owners are permitted to retain a stake 
and/or control after insolvency, then informal work-outs with a lesser stake to be 
retained by the incumbent owners are hindered. The degree to which restructuring law 
limits the range of informal contractual solutions depends on the ease of access to the 
restructuring procedures.  
            From an ex post economic efficiency point of view we also want to evaluate 
whether procedures are “survival”-or “shut-down” oriented quite independent of 
whether control changes hands or not. Survival of a firm is possible even if liquidation 
is mandatory under formal procedures, because an insolvent firm’s assets can be sold 
as a ”going concern”. The assets can even be sold back to the original owners. 
Furthermore, creditors can agree on an informal work-out prior to bankruptcy with 
conditions for the owners. Thus, an evaluation of the survival-orientation of 
insolvency procedures requires that incentives for informal work-outs, and incentives 
for the sale of assets as a “going concern” are analyzed. These incentives are naturally 
strongly influenced by the design of formal insolvency law, its application and 
enforcement.  
         Table 2 is based on Wood’s  (1995) assessment of the degree of creditor or 
debtor orientation of formal procedures in different countries. Wood defines a 
creditor-oriented law as one that recognizes the claims of creditors to the greatest 
extent in insolvency. A debtor-oriented law allows debtors to retain a stake and/or 
control in insolvency although there is no equity left in the firm. 
          The table rates traditional British law as the most creditor-oriented, and current 
French law as the most debtor-oriented. The implementation of formal procedures for 
restructuring (administration) in 1985 and 1986 has made British law less creditor-
oriented but it is still rated as marginally more creditor oriented than German, Dutch 
and Swedish law. Japanese and US laws are rated in the middle as more creditor-
oriented than Italian, Spanish, and French law. Most developing countries base their 
The Role of Foreign Banks in Corporate Governance (and Restructuring) in CEECS  8
insolvency laws on the law of the former colonial power, while the former members 
of the communist block seem to have adopted an insolvency law akin to one of the 
Western European laws. 
        The main determinants of the creditor-orientation are listed in Table 3. 
Increasing the scope and efficiency of security allows more financing against 
collateral with greater probability for the secured creditors to keep the claim intact. 
On the other hand, the stronger the position of secured creditors, the less likely it is 
that unsecured creditors, employees, and the state will be paid in insolvency.  
         The existence of a rehabilitation statute or restructuring law reduces or weakens 
the position of creditors, because debtors are able to seek protection against some or 
all creditors, and it allows a search for a court-led solution with control and a 
remaining stake for the debtor. From creditors’ point of view restructuring law may 
have the advantage that debtors have a stronger incentive to maximize the value of the 
assets even when distress can be foreseen. These incentives depend on the prospects 
for an informal work-out, however. It is argued below that a stronger position of 
creditors enhances the likelihood of a work-out.  
      If the law allows set-offs in insolvency, then some unsecured creditors have a de 
facto security in the form of a debt to the insolvent firm. 
          Recognition of ownership of assets in the possession of the debtor but not 
formally owned by the same is a controversial issue and ambiguous from the point of 
view of creditor-orientation. Clearly, if assets in a trust are deemed to belong to the 
estate of the insolvent firm it increases the funds available for creditors. On the other 
hand, recognition of ownership to assets in a trust can be seen as recognition of ex 
ante contractual relations, which is also the principle of recognition of security. 
             Whether the veil of incorporation and therefore limited liability of 
shareholders, and protection of directors against personal liability actually protects 
creditors or not can be debated depending on circumstances, but upholding the 
protection offered by the veil in insolvency can also be seen as recognition of ex ante 
contractual relations. 
                     The upshot of this discussion is that the classification of creditor 
orientation as above amounts to the increased recognition of ex ante contractual 
relations after the filing for bankruptcy or restructuring rather than a clear-cut 
classification of the position of debtors and creditors. 
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_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 2: Creditor/Debtor Orientation of  Corporate Insolvency Law 
(Based on Wood (1995) The orientation refers to explicit law disregarding 
the practical implementation through the court system)  
Scale: 1= Extremely pro-creditor          10= Extremely pro-debtor 
 
1. Former British colonies except S. Africa, Zimbabwe 
2. England, Australia, Ireland 
3. Germany, Netherlands, Indonesia, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland 
4. Scotland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway 
5. United States, Canada except Quebec 
6. S. Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe (all Dutch-based); Austria, Denmark, 
Czech and Slovak Republics 
7. Italy 
8. Greece, Portugal, Spain, most Latin American countries (except 
Paraguay that protects security interests strongly) 
9. Former French colonies, Egypt, Zaire; (Belgium) 
10. France  
No insolvency law: Liberia (many Arab countries) 
Not classified: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Khazakstan 
 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
                    Insolvency laws vary across countries in terms of scope and efficiency of 
security. Table 3 includes a rating of the attitude to security expressed in some 
countries’ laws. Countries are rated on a scale from very sympathetic to very hostile 
to security. Of particular interest here is the protection offered “floating charges”, i.e. 
security against all existing and potential assets, and the position of employees and the 
state. Floating charges can be viewed as extending the scope of assets that can be 
offered as security to intangibles. Countries listed as very sympathetic to security 
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allow floating charges as security. Countries listed as sympathetic rank employees and 
the state below all senior creditors, while at least some senior creditors are ranked 
below employees and the state in “hostile” countries4. 
          Wihlborg and Gangopadhyay (2001) show in more detail how 
different industrialized countries are ranked in the different dimensions of 
insolvency law listed in Table 3. Countries are ranked differently with respect to 
creditor orientation in different important dimensions. While the traditional 
English procedures and the French procedures are on either extreme in all 
dimensions, the German system is actually more creditor oriented than the 
English in two dimensions.  Both German and Japanese laws protect title 
finance strongly, but contracts are not recognized as strongly “across the board 
“as in British law. For example, set-offs and trusts are recognized in British law. 
The scope of security is also wider in British law with the strong recognition of 
floating charges. These differences affect incentives of different creditors in 
informal work-outs. 
        Since one objective of insolvency law is to keep viable entities alive the 
role of rehabilitation statutes is particularly interesting. The US legal system is 
very debtor friendly in terms of prospects for rehabilitation under Ch.11, but 
relatively creditor friendly in other dimensions, and, therefore, in bankruptcy  
proceedings for distressed firms not seeking protection under Ch.11. 
            Even countries that are considered hostile to formal rehabilitation have some 
legal procedure for restructuring. Most common are “compositions” implying a 
moratorium on the payment of debts and the possibility of a negotiated restructuring 
of creditors’ claims. These composition procedures are very rarely used, however, 
because of requirements for immediate payments of a share of non-secured creditors’ 
claims (Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden and others), or because the 
debtor must show that insolvency resulted from misfortune rather than 
mismanagement (Belgium, Luxembourg). 
                  More debtor-friendly restructuring law has been implemented in recent 
decades in a number of countries. The French law of 1967 changed the orientation of 
                               
4 In some “sympathetic” countries employees are protected by other means. For example, in Sweden 
there is a state supported wage guarantee for employees of bankrupt firms. 
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French law strongly. Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code was enacted in 1978. 
British “administration proceedings” have been possible since 1986. Australia  
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3. Determinants of high degree of credit orientation following 
Wood (1995) 
 
1. Wide scope and efficiency on bankruptcy of security and title financing 
(retention of title, factoring, leasing) 
Country attitudes to security: 
Very sympathetic         Sympathetic          Hostile           Very hostile 
 
English common          Germany               Belgium            Austria  
law countries                Japan                    Luxembourg      France 
Sweden                         Netherlands          Greece               Italy 
Finland                         Switzerland           Spain    
Norway                         Scotland               Most Latin American 
                               S. Africa                countries 
 
2. Weak corporate rehabilitation statutes  
3. Insolvency set-off enables reciprocal unsecured creditor to be paid 
ahead of other unsecured creditors 
4. *Ownership of assets in the possession of debtor is recognized (e.g. 
trusts)  
5. *Veil of incorporation and protection of directors against personal 
liability 
 
*These determinants are ambiguous from creditors point of view (See text.) 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
allowed formal restructuring in 1992, while Germany and Sweden have 
enacted restructuring laws in 1994 and 1996 but the latter two laws are not 
much different from already existing composition laws. Modern French 
law (redressement judiciaire and reglement amiable), and American law 
(Chapter 11) provide relatively easy access to restructuring procedures. The 
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courts will accept a debtor’s application if there is some likelihood that the 
firm is a viable entity.       
           Restructuring laws differ in terms of their protection of various claims on 
the debtor. These differences reflect the objectives of the law.  While British law 
is oriented towards upholding contracts, French law in particular explicitly gives 
the courts the role of keeping firms in operation, and preserving employment. The 
control over the firm in restructuring shifts to the courts or to a person assigned by 
the court to different degrees.  In countries with mild restructuring laws, 
management certainly loses control.  Under Ch. 11 in the U.S., the management 
retains control, under court supervision.  In other countries the influence of 
management is up to the courts and depends on the court’s objectives.  In France 
in particular the courts’ powers are used to protect employees and the role of the 
old management is subordinated to this objective. 
        The differences among restructuring laws reflect not only their objectives 
but, most likely, the different organizations of financial systems and the rules for 
banking.  Kaiser (1994) observes that American banks are reluctant to get much 
involved in corporate decisions, because they may be held liable for bad advice 
(lender’s liability). There are many alternative sources of financing in the 
American marketplace in particular, with the result that a corporation’s financial 
structure is often complex with a large number of creditor groups with conflicting 
interests.  A negotiated informal work-out involving debt-rescheduling or 
reduction can therefore be difficult to achieve (Baird 1997 a and b). There is 
always a risk that one creditor demands full, immediate repayment, thus 
preventing a negotiated settlement.  Accordingly, the courts are able to bind 
dissenters in Ch. 11 proceedings. 
            Most continental European and Japanese financial markets are bank-oriented, 
and banks are deeply involved in corporate decision making.  One bank tends to serve 
as the “house-bank” and main senior creditor of each corporation.  The house-bank is 
well-informed about the economic situation of the firm, and it can initiate informal 
work-out negotiations.  Therefore the banks determine the treatment of insolvent 
firms in the vast majority of insolvencies. Also in the UK banks tend to lead informal 
work-outs although the position of banks in corporate control is weaker than on the 
continent (see Franks and Sussman, 2000). British banks do not risk liability as 
American banks do, however. 
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              Rehabilitation proceedings or restructurings have a low success rate in most 
countries, including France and the U.S. where the proceedings are relatively 
accessible. Kaiser (1994) presents date for the U.S.A., Germany, France and the U.K.  
In both the U.S. and France most firms filing for Ch. 11 or applying for restructuring 
end up being liquidated but the time it takes to get there is longer.  The experience in 
France is that many of the firms being restructured  -- often for reasons of preserving 
employment – return to insolvency after some time.  In the U.S., the firms exiting 
from Ch. 11 seem to survive more often. However, Ch. 11 allows many insolvent 
firms to live for a year or two, only to end up being liquidated. 
        In order to evaluate whether restructuring law actually contributes to the survival 
of viable entities, or only allows economically distressed firms an extended life under 
legal protection, we have to compare effects of restructuring law with incentives of 
creditors to contribute to informal work-outs with or without the incumbent 
management. 
 
 
4. The Practical Application of Insolvency Law  
To what extent are financially distressed firms rehabilitated in informal work-outs, 
and to what extent are economically distressed firms allowed to survive under 
different insolvency regimes? In this section we look at this question and empirical 
evidence that may have a bearing on the efficiency of different insolvency law 
regimes. 
         Thorburn (2000) analyzes the results of 300 liquidation cases in Sweden 
between 1987 and 1991. She finds that in 75 percent of the cases the bankrupt firms 
survived as “going concerns”.  Sweden has a strongly creditor oriented law and allows 
floating charges like the UK. Restructuring law was and remains inaccessible. On the 
other hand the incidence of bankruptcy is very high in an international comparison. 
The procedure employed by the courts in bankruptcy is “cash auction” of the firms, 
meaning that the courts take over the insolvent firm and try to sell the whole entity to 
the highest bidder.   
          Stromberg (2000) argues that the Swedish cash auction system tends to lead to a 
sale of assets back to the original owner in cases when the bank benefits from this 
solution. This observation implies that the auction system under creditor-oriented law 
to a large extent accomplishes what restructuring laws are designed to accomplish. 
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            Franks and Sussman (2000) present complementary evidence for Britain. They 
show in a study of three banks’ handling of distressed firms that the banks have 
implemented elaborate informal rescue processes. The majority of distressed firms 
remain outside formal procedures, and the rate of liquidation does not seem 
particularly high, when banks remain in control of the insolvency procedure.  
Wood (1995) notes that the greatest disincentive for informal work-outs of distress 
situations is the existence of relatively debtor friendly restructuring law.  The 
evidence for Sweden and the UK seem to confirm this observation. Furthermore, there 
is no evidence that the existence of strong restructuring law (France, U.S.) allows a 
greater survival rate for financially distressed but viable firms as compared to 
countries with no or ineffective restructuring laws (U.K., Germany, Sweden). The 
caveat to be noted here is that the evidence presented refers to periods with normal 
economic conditions. 
             The conclusion that may be drawn from the evidence presented is that the 
absence of restructuring law has not hindered the survival of viable firms in financial 
distress during normal times, and probably speeded up the shut-down of economically 
distressed firms. The anecdotal evidence from Sweden during a period of severe 
macroeconomic crisis 1991-93 including a banking crisis indicates that the Swedish 
informal system for restructuring did not function as well as during normal times, 
however. The willingness of banks to supply credit for survival was reduced, and 
there were few potential buyers with the means to buy distressed firms as “going 
concern” 5 
            In spite of the evidence presented on the effectiveness of restructuring in the 
highly creditor oriented systems, the government in the UK is preparing to introduce 
legislation aimed at shifting the balance in favor of the (well behaved, but 'unlucky', 
entrepreneurs) as part of its drive to encourage 'entrepreneurism'.  In the US, which 
has legislation that favors debtors much more than that of the UK, the government 
looks set to shift the balance back towards the creditors in an attempt to reduce moral 
hazard.  
                               
5 An important question is whether a system with easier access to formal restructuring procedures could 
function better during macroeconomic crisis. Formal reorganization procedures may have the 
advantage of providing more time for alternative bidders to appear. The cost would be that the life of 
economically distressed firms could be prolonged as well. It is possible that the only effective remedy 
is to resolve a threatening banking crisis quickly. 
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               The evidence presented so far refers to Europe and the USA. Turning to 
emerging market economies it is common that the discrepancy between formal law 
and actual procedures is large. There are three possible explanations for such a 
discrepancy. First, the credit allocation process of banks may be influenced by 
political factors, and specific groups with strong relations to a bank. Second, the legal 
process for dealing with insolvency according to the law may be ineffective, time 
consuming, and/or corrupt. Third, creditors and debtors may prefer informal 
procedures, perhaps because their value system differs from the one expressed in law. 
For example, insolvency procedures in Latin America are described in Rowat and 
Astigarraga (1999) as “woefully inadequate” in most countries of the region. The 
procedures are rigid and formalistic, they give judges too much arbitrary power to 
serve what they consider the “general interest”, there is widespread cynicism about 
political influences overriding judgements, there is a powerful bias in favor of labor 
claimants, and corruption is rampant.  
             Turning to the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe many have 
implemented modern insolvency law but few have managed to enforce the laws 
successfully. Poland and Estonia seem to be the countries that have progressed the 
most in terms developing a functioning insolvency system based on law.6  However, 
lack of capacity in the legal system is a problem in all the countries. Lack of expertise 
and tradition affect the time of proceedings take, as well as the ability of creditors to 
recover assets from the insolvent estate. Uncertain and ill-defined property rights have 
naturally been a hindrance for secured lending in Eastern Europe. 
            Djankov (1998) reports about Romania that “isolation programs” for large 
loss- making state enterprises have been implemented but the soft budget constraint 
imposed by banks have undermined these administrative restructuring procedures. 
Banking reform has not progressed far. Djankov questions the effectiveness of 
administrative restructuring procedures outside the court system on the grounds that 
such systems are more vulnerable to interferences by special interest groups. 
            Insolvency procedures in Russia are discussed in, for example, Gaddy and 
Ickes (1999a and b) and Freinkman and Starodubrovskaya (1995). There is a modern 
insolvency law but the procedures seem to be used for asset diversion of enormous 
                               
6 See, for example, Coates and Mirsky (1995), Gray (1996) and (1997), and Montes-Negret and Papi 
(1996) 
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magnitudes through the activities of an “arbitration managers” appointed by a court to 
lead the insolvent entity after bankruptcy filing. Large resources of industrial groups 
are spent on influencing the choice of arbitration manager.7 Black (2001) suggests 
much the same thing about Russia, arguing that the laws are in fact adequate but that 
enforcement is grossly inadequate.  
        As a point of reference for the study of bankers’ perceptions below, we present 
indicators of creditor right protection in Croatia, Estonia, and Poland based on Pistor, 
Raiser, and Gelfer (2000). These authors have created indicators reflecting aspects of 
insolvency law. The indicators are similar to those in La Porta et al (1997) but more 
detailed. Table 4 shows four different “scores” for creditor protection in formal law, 
and three indicators of the “quality” of the legal system. The table footnotes shows the 
aspects of law that are reflected in the different scores. The 4 scores rank the three 
countries differently. It is therefore not obvious from this table which country has the 
strongest creditor rights.  Poland seems to have weak protection in terms of Score 1 
meaning that rehabilitation law is relatively accessible and debtor friendly. Croatia 
seems to have weak protection in terms of Score 3 reflecting the scope and 
effectiveness of security. In terms of Score 4 Estonia has the weakest protection in 
Table 4. This score pertains primarily to managers’ liability for actions prior to 
bankruptcy. 
        We argued above that the most critical characteristics of law for evaluating 
creditor orientation are accessibility of rehabilitation law (Score 1), and the scope of 
security (Score 2). Adding these two scores Estonia would seems to offer the 
strongest protection for creditors in formal law. 
           Turning to the indicators of the quality of the legal system the differences 
among the countries are small. If any country has an edge (marginally) it would be 
Estonia being the strongest in terms of enforcement, equal to Poland in terms of Legal 
effectiveness and only slightly below Poland in terms of Rule of law. Croatia would 
be the country looking marginally weaker that the other two. This weakness is 
expected to contribute more to the debtor orientation of procedures in Croatia than in 
the other two countries. 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
                               
7 See Wihlborg and Gangopadhyay for an elaboration on this description. 
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Table 4: Creditor Rights and Enforcement indicators in 1998 based on Pistor, Raiser 
and Gelfer (2000) 
       
                    Creditor rights    
 Score 1              
Max=4 
 
 
Score 2 
Max=5 
Score 3 
Max=3 
Score 4 
Max=3 
Rule of 
Law  
 
Max=10           
Legal 
Effective
ness 
Max=4 
Enforce
ment  
    
Max=1 
Croatia     4     5      1      2      7      3     .65 
Estonia     4     4      3      1      8.5      4     .77 
Poland     2.25     4.25      3      1.5      8.7      4     .70 
Score 1: 1/0 for Restrictions for going into reorganization + 
               1/0 for No automatic stay on secured assets + 
               1/.75/.5/.25/0 for Secured assets priority + 
               1/0 for Management does not stay in charge. 
Score 2: 2nd , 3rd, and 4th criteria under score 1 + 
              1/0 for Automatic trigger to file bankruptcy + 
              1/0 for Reorganization or liquidation plan requires creditors’ consent 
Score 3:1/0 for Establishing security interest in movable asset does not require 
transfer + 
             1/0 for Law requires register for security interests in movables + 
             1/0 for Security interest in land may be established 
Score 4: 1/0 for Legal provision allows creditors to pierce the corporate veil + 
              1/0 for Management can be held liable for violating insolvency law + 
              1/.75/.5/.25 for Transactions preceding bankruptcy may be declared null and   
void. 
Rule of Law from expert rating. 
Legal Effectiveness  from EBRD Survey of legal practitioners 
Enforcement is proportion of firms in EBRD survey agreeing that ”I am confident that 
the legal system will uphold any contract and property rights in business disputes” 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that legal system weaknesses can be substituted for by 
private arrangements reducing the impact of ineffective laws on some banking 
activities. An example of this can be seen in the practices of Croatian banks regarding 
consumer loans. The banks generally force borrowers to have a co-debtor and two 
guarantors when signing the loan contract. If the borrower fails to repay, the co-debtor 
and guarantors are fully liable. The system usually functions without recourse to the 
courts, and overall levels of repayment (including the activation of the co-debtor and 
guarantor) remain extremely high (98-99%). (Galac 2002, Kraft 2000) Clearly, some 
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degree of rule of law must exist "in the background" to make banks' threats credible; 
but it seems that such business methods can be effective even with relative weak and 
inefficient legal practice. 
        Similarly, in a non-banking example, Frye (2001) finds that the courts are not 
important in protecting the property rights of small shopkeepers in Warsaw and 
Moscow. While two-thirds of Warsaw shopkeepers believe they could use the courts 
to sue local government if necessary, in general, they do not resort to this. 
 
5. Perceptions of insolvency procedures in Croatia, Estonia and Poland 
Murrell (2002) argues that in fact the overall development of formal institutions 
in transition countries is now quite high and in line with institutional 
development in other countries of similar GDP/capita. He suggests that much of 
the problem lies in enforcement of law. Ultimately, it may be less important 
whether the law is debtor or creditor oriented as long as there is enforcement of 
the law that exits. Without enforcement through the court system either banks 
ration credits or enforcement must be “internalized”.8  
           In this section we describe how managers of foreign banks in several 
countries perceive the quality of insolvency and debt recovery procedures. The 
perceptions are obtained from our questionnaire. We are interested in 
discovering which dimensions of insolvency procedures are particularly 
important for credit policies, and monitoring efforts of banks. Although debtor-
friendly legislation and legal practice seem to be widespread around the world, 
financial systems nonetheless function. Thus the interesting empirical question 
is not so much whether legal frameworks are debtor friendly (they usually are) 
or whether formal bankruptcy and foreclosure procedures are slow and costly (it 
almost goes without saying) but the extent to which legal frameworks are debtor 
friendly and just how slow and costly procedures are. Even more, it seems 
important to identify the impacts of specific weaknesses in the legal framework 
                               
8 Conglomerates—in particular those formed around a bank—may be seen as an organization 
that is able to internalize enforcement of debt-contracts.  
Conglomerates—in particular those formed around a bank—may be seen as an organization that 
is able to internalize enforcement of debt-contracts.  
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in environment. In particular, one would like to know which weaknesses in the 
legal framework prevent lending altogether, as opposed to weaknesses that can 
be compensated for by higher spreads.  
        In all three countries foreign banks play a very large, if not dominating, 
role in the banking systems. The questionnaire was sent to all foreign owned 
banks. Only in Estonia did we not receive answers from all the banks. 
Nevertheless, the two responding banks in Estonia constitute more than 50 
percent of the Estonian banking sector in terms of assets. 
I. Questions regarding overall impact of insolvency procedures. 
The first question (I.a.) may be seen as an indicator of the degree to which 
banks ration credit, while the second question indicates whether banks charge a 
higher interest rate than in the home country as a result of weak insolvency 
procedures. 
a.   Inefficient debt recovery procedures make us reluctant to finance firms’     
investments, and the loan interest rate cannot compensate us for the risk we 
would take. (5 = very reluctant) 
 Poland (10) Croatia  (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 3,3 2,3 2,5 
Min 2 1 2 
Max 5 4 3 
Note: There is substantial variation in perceptions within each country. On 
average Polish banks are the most reluctant to lend. In the next question we 
observe that Polish banks also feel the strongest regarding the need to charge a 
high spread. 
 
 
b. In comparison with the home country, and in accordance with my experience 
the interest rate spread in this host country is higher because of inefficient 
debt recovery procedures. (5 = Yes ) 
 Poland (8) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 3,4 3,0 3,5 
Min 1 1 3 
Max 5 5 4 
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II. Perceptions about aspects of procedures 
 
1. Describe the recovery process for security: (time, cost, predictable) 
 
a/  (time) (5 =  very slow) 
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 4 4,8 3,5 
Min 3 4 3 
Max 5 5 4 
 
b/  (cost) (5 = very costly) 
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 4 3,4 3 
Min 3 2 3 
Max 5 4 3 
 
 
c/  (predictability) (5 = very arbitrary) 
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 3,6 4,0 3,5 
Min 2 2 3 
Max 5 5 4 
 
2. What is the value of collateral relative to the value of loans. 
Estonia 60% 
 
3. Describe the formal bankruptcy and rehabilitation procedures by answering 
the following questions: 
 
a) Does bankruptcy law provide for strong protection of creditors’ interests 
according to the letter of  the law: (5 = not at all)  
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 3,6 4,1 2,5 
Min 3 1 2 
Max 5 5 3 
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Note: There is difference of opinion about the letter of the law in Croatia in 
particular. On the average the formal procedures are considered the most debtor 
friendly in Croatia and the most creditor friendly in Estonia. The observation for 
Estonia is consistent with the indicators in Table 4 above. 
 
b)   Is the letter of law made more or less irrelevant by lack of enforcement in 
court? (5 = law is not enforced) 
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 2,2 4,1 2 
Min 2 2 2 
Max 5 5 2 
Note: We observe again differences of opinion, and the weakest enforcement in 
Croatia. This observation is also consistent with the indicators in Table 4. 
 
c)   Are the courts unpredictable because of lack of knowledge, experience, 
training? (5 = lacking in these respects) 
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 2,1 3,8 3,5 
Min 1 2 3 
Max 5 5 4 
Note: Polish courts are considered the most knowledgeable although the opinion 
varies substantially. 
 
d) Are the courts unpredictable because of political influences and/or 
corruption? (5= strong influences/corruption ) 
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 2,7 2,9 1,5 
Min 1 1 1 
Max 4 4 2 
Note: Estonia seems relatively free from “influences” while some banks 
consider political influences strong in Croatia and Poland. 
       Transparency International’s corruption index for the three countries on a 
scale of 10 (no corruption) is the following: Estonia, 5.6; Poland, 4.1; Croatia, 
3.9. 
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e) The courts are unpredictable because of strong arbitrary powers of judges. 
(5=agree ) 
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 2,8 3,1 3 
Min 1 1 3 
Max 5 4 3 
Note:  The three countries receive the same average score but the dispersion is 
high in Croatia and Poland. 
 
f) Would you say that formal bankruptcy procedures are very time consuming? 
(5=very time consuming) 
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 4,3 4,8 4,5 
Min 3 4 4 
Max 5 5 5 
Note: In all the countries the procedures are seen as time consuming.  
 
 
 
g)   As a foreign entity we cannot enforce credit contracts with the same 
effectiveness as domestically owned banks because the law is discriminatory. (5 
= discriminatory) 
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 1,2 1,7 1,5 
Min 1 1 1 
Max 2 3 2 
 
h)  We cannot enforce credit contracts with the same effectiveness as 
domestically owned banks because  we are discriminated against in court. (5= 
discriminatory) 
 Poland (11) Croatia (9) Estonia (2) 
Average 1,6 1,7 1,5 
Min 1 1 1 
Max 4 3 2 
Note:  Neither laws nor courts are perceived as discriminatory on the average, 
although a few banks in Croatia and Poland have different opinions. 
 
 
The Role of Foreign Banks in Corporate Governance (and Restructuring) in CEECS  23
 
5. There is a separate law for rehabilitation procedures in court or under 
administrative procedures  
a) Estonia Yes (  X )   No (    ) 
   Croatia Yes (  )   No ( X   ) 
 
 
b) Is it true that the formal procedures for rehabilitation are very seldom used, 
because debtors rarely qualify for the procedures. (5 = often) 
 Poland (11) Croatia Estonia (1) 
Average 2,2  2 
Min 1  2 
Max 5  2 
 Note: Although formal rehabilitation procedures exist in Poland and Estonia 
they do not seem easily accessible. Opinions vary in Poland, however. In Table 
4 we observed that Poland has the relatively most debtor friendly rehabilitation 
law. 
 
 
c)  Is it correct that true that the formal rehabilitation procedures are very time 
consuming allowing insolvent debtors to continue operation? (5 = true) 
 Poland (11) Croatia Estonia (1) 
Average 3,7  2 
Min 2  2 
Max 5  2 
 
 
 
 
 
d)   Is it true that the formal rehabilitation procedures allow debtors to divert 
assets away from the insolvent estate? (5 = true ) 
 Poland (10) Croatia Estonia (1) 
Average 3,6  4 
Min 2  4 
Max 5  4 
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e) Is it correct that once format rehabilitation procedures have been initiated 
security cannot be enforced and creditors position is weak? (5 = true)  
 Poland (11) Croatia Estonia (1) 
Average 3,4  3 
Min 2  3 
Max 4  3 
Note:  In Poland and Estonia where formal rehabilitation procedures exist they 
are perceived to weaken creditors position substantially. Correspondingly, the 
answers under 5b indicate that restrictive access to the procedures lead to 
infrequent use of the procedures. At least one Polish bank disagrees strongly 
with this assessment, however. 
 
6) Rehabilitation is handled informally by a bank much more frequently 
than formally under legal or administrative procedures. 
 
a)  Estonia  Yes   ( 1  )   No   ( 1  ) 
 
b)   Formal law and procedures are such that debtors easily agree to informal 
rehabilitation (5 = yes, debtors prefer informal procedures)  
 Poland (10) Croatia Estonia (2) 
Average 3,5  2 
Min 2  2 
Max 5  2 
Note:  Debtors do not seem to prefer informal procedures indicating that 
informal procedures are mostly used, because debtors lack access to formal 
rehabilitation.  
c)   As a creditor we often enter informal negotiations, because formal 
procedures offer no real and predictable alternative. (5=yes, formal procedures 
offer no real alternative) 
 Poland (10) Croatia Estonia (2) 
Average 3,8  3,5 
Min 1  3 
Max 5  4 
Note: Creditors seem to avoid formal rehabilitation as we would expect after 
seeing the responses to the above questions.  
 
As a summary assessment Estonia seems to be perceived to be the most creditor 
oriented in terms of formal procedures. This assessment is consistent with 
strong similarity between Estonian and Scandinavian bankruptcy law. 
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Enforcement is still not strong, however, although it seems stronger than in 
Poland and Croatia.  
      Polish law is strongly influenced by the relatively creditor oriented German 
law but even the formal law is not generally perceived as creditor oriented. On 
the average enforcement is perceived as weaker than in Estonia and a few Polish 
banks consider enforcement very weak and rehabilitation procedures as a device 
for creditors to delay payments and divert assets. 
       The Croatian formal law is perceived as the most debtor oriented in spite of 
the lack of formal rehabilitation procedures. The law is inspired by both 
Austrian and Italian law. Both these countries have relatively debtor oriented 
laws according to Table 2 above. The enforcement is also the weakest in Croatia 
according to the perceptions. There is arbitrariness in judgments and a 
perception of political influences on courts.  
 
6. Perceptions of insolvency procedures and credit policy. 
In this section we use the answers to questions I.a. and I.b. as indicators of 
credit policy of individual banks. In Question I.a. banks were asked whether 
they were reluctant to lend because interest rates cannot compensate for risk 
caused by weak bankruptcy procedures. In Question 1.b. banks were asked 
whether they charged a higher interest rate spread on loans in the host country 
than in the home country as a result of weak bankruptcy procedures. 
       As can be seen above the dispersion of perceptions among banks is 
substantial in the questions reflecting credit policy, as well as in questions about 
laws and their enforcement. We expect that the banks considering procedures 
relatively creditor oriented are the banks that are reluctant to lend unless they 
can raise the interest rate to compensate for risk.  
        In the following we study the correlations between Questions I.a. and I.b. 
on the one hand, and perceptions about different aspects of insolvency 
procedures on the other. Thereby we wish to discover which aspects of the 
insolvency procedures are particularly important for restricting credit or for 
raising the interest rate spread. Table 4 shows correlations for Polish and 
Estonian firms, while Table 5 shows the correlations for Croatian firms. 
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The correlations in Table 4 indicate that banks’ reluctance to lend in Poland 
including two banks in Estonia is correlated particularly strongly with the 
perceptions that: 
Formal laws offer weak protection of creditors interest, 
Courts are subject to political influences and corruption,  
Procedures are time-consuming, 
Courts are discriminatory, and 
Creditors view formal proceedings as preferrable to work-outs. 
 
The bank’s view that the interest rate spread is higher than in the home country 
is correlated with the view that: 
Procedures to recover security are arbitrary, 
Formal law offers weak protection of creditors’ interest, 
Enforcement is weak, 
Courts are discriminatory, 
Rehabilitation is fast, and 
Creditors view formal proceedings as preferable to work-outs. 
The characteristics that are correlated with reluctance to lend are largely the 
same as the characteristics that are correlated with the interest spread in Estonia 
and Poland. Only the correlation between Rehabilitation is fast and the interest  
spread is possibly surprising. However, fast rehabilitation may contribute to 
making formal rehabilitation attractive, and thereby weaken creditors’ position. 
         Turning to Croatia there are no questions referring to rehabilitation 
procedures, since there is no formal procedure. Additional questions referring to 
banking supervision and regulation in Croatia are included in Table 5.  
In Croatia, reluctance to lend is most strongly correlated with the following 
characteristics: 
Arbitrary judge, 
Bankruptcy time consuming (negative corr.), 
Law offers weak protection 
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Costly recovery. 
 
The interest spread is correlated most strongly with the following characteristics 
in Croatia: 
Political influences and corruption of courts, 
Courts’ lack of expertise, 
Law offers weak  protection, 
Costly recovery. 
 
Both reluctance to lend and the interest spread are correlated with perceptions of 
weak protection in law, and costly recovery of security. Other perceived 
important characteristics in Croatia refer to the lack of a strong, independent 
court system. The correlation is negative between reluctance to lend and 
bankruptcy time consuming. The negative correlation is not expected but it may 
be explained by the low expectations of a positive outcome in court. 
           In the case of Croatia the correlation between the answers to I.a. (“we are 
reluctant to lend because of weak debt recovery procedures”) and I.b.(“interest 
rate spreads are higher because of inefficient insolvency procedures”) is weakly 
negative. This result suggests that reluctance to lend and increasing the interest 
spread are seen as two rather distinct and incompatible responses by the 
Croatian respondents. Nevertheless, the two responses to weak insolvency 
procedures seem to be correlated with similar perceptions about characteristics 
of insolvency procedures.  
        The additional questions for Croatian bankers referring to supervision of 
banks indicate that specific demands of supervisors cause high interest rate 
spreads. The same specific demands are negatively correlated with reluctance to 
lend, however. More demands by Croatian supervisors are also negatively 
correlated with reluctance to lend, and positively correlated with the interest rate 
spread. These responses are surprising but could be explained if the demands by 
supervisors refer to encouragement of credit supply while allowing banks to 
compensate for risk by raising interest rates. 
         One could view the banks answering in this manner as willing to lend 
under the rather imperfect legal conditions in Croatia, but perhaps satisfied that 
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Croatia’s higher interest spreads cover the costs imposed by inadequate legal 
conditions. This, however, does raise an interesting hypothetical question: if 
spreads fell sharply, perhaps due to intensified competition, and the legal system 
did not improve substantially, would the banks’ perceptions change? In 
particular, would they become reluctant to lend, and even consider leaving 
Croatia? This is not at all an idle question, and should be taken quite seriously 
by the Croatian authorities. An additional possibility is that banks in Croatia 
will find themselves with relatively risky credit portfolios.  
        Although cross-country comparisons must be interpreted carefully, it is 
interesting to compare Croatia to Estonia and Poland. Which perceptions are the 
“show-stoppers” in the different countries, i.e. the factors that make banks 
reluctant to lend at all? In Croatia, the main show-stopper seems to be arbitrary 
judicial authority, while in Poland and Estonia combined the main show-stopper 
is discrimination against foreigners in court, followed by arbitrary judicial 
powers and corruption, and then debtor-friendly law combined with weak 
enforcement of creditors’ rights. It can also be noted that Croatia’s insolvency 
procedures actually are perceived more negatively than Poland and Estonia on 
characteristics that become “show-stoppers” in Poland and Estonia.     
 
7. Stylized facts about credit policies in Croatia, Estonia and Poland. 
          The validity of the above observations about perceptions about insolvency 
procedures and credit policies could be tested if we had reliable data about banks’ 
lending and interest rates on loans. Lacking such data we can ask what the differences 
in perceptions across countries may imply on the aggregate level for indicators of 
banks’ and borrowers behavior. Strongly creditor oriented insolvency procedures are 
expected to reduce the degree of credit rationing by banks if they are subject to market 
discipline and governed according to shareholder wealth maximizing principles. Thus, 
the supply of credit at a given interest rate spread is expected to be relatively high 
under these conditions. The demand for credit would be lower under the same 
conditions if the banks impose hard budget constraints on borrowers. The supply side 
is expected to be binding to the extent that there is a degree of rationing. 
         Debtor oriented procedures would increase the demand for loans but the supply 
would adjust to the higher demand only if the government is expected to protect banks 
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from losses caused by non-performing loans. Thus, we cannot predict a relation 
between credit supply and insolvency procedures without knowledge about 
governments’ policies with respect to protection of banks against credit losses.  
        Debtor oriented procedures are sustainable if either banks can compensate 
themselves for expected credit losses by asking for higher spreads, or if governments 
offer a degree of protection against losses. Creditor oriented procedures on the other 
hand are sustainable without government protection of banks.  
        A high share of non-performing loans year after year can be seen as an indication 
of debtor orientation of insolvency procedures. Recent  World Bank data shows that 
Croatian banks’ ratio of non-performing loans to assets is 15.5 percent. The 
corresponding figures for Poland and Estonia are 4,7 and 2 percent. EBRD (1999) 
shows that in relative terms these figures are representative since the mid 90s. This 
relative frequency of non-performing loans is consistent with the observed perception 
of relatively debtor oriented insolvency procedures in Croatia, and relatively creditor 
oriented procedures in Estonia.  
      We cannot observe directly, if the interest spreads in the three countries can 
explain these ratios, or if government protection play an important role in Croatia in 
particular. If government protection plays an important role we expect that the share 
of bank credit in the financing of non-government entities should be relatively high in 
Croatia. On the other hand, if government protection does not play a role in any of the 
countries we expect that Estonia should have the highest share of bank credit in the 
financing of firms, assuming that interest rate spreads cannot compensate completely 
for credit risk. 
       Fries and Taci (2002) show ratios of non-governmental sector credit to GDP in 
1999. For Croatia, Poland and Estonia the ratios are 38.5, 28.8, and 35.8. The 
relatively high figure for Croatia is consistent with debtor orientation in combination 
with a greater degree of government protection than in Poland and Estonia. The 
higher ratio in Estonia relative to Poland is consistent with stronger creditor protection 
in Estonia.  
        Fries and Taci also calculate ”market economy benchmarks” for the ratios of 
credit to GDP. The benchmarks are obtained from extrapolation based on a regression 
of the ratios in industrialized market economies on GNP/capita. The distances from 
the benchmarks are 8.4 for Croatia, 29.9 for Poland and 12.9 for Estonia. For all the 
countries the actual ratios are below the market economy benchmarks indicating a 
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degree of underdevelopment of the banking systems. The discussion here implies that 
the small distance from the benchmark for Croatia need not be an indication of less 
underdevelopment of the banking system but may be caused by debtor oriented 
insolvency procedures and a degree of government protection of banks. Similarly, the 
Estonian and Polish figures can be explained by differences in insolvency procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Role of Foreign Banks in Corporate Governance (and Restructuring) in CEECS  31
Table 4. Correlations for Estonian (2) and Polish firms (11) 
 Parentheses refer to question 
number.      I.a      I.b 
 Bank 
reluctant to 
lend 
Higher int.rate 
spread 
slow recovery (1.a.) 0,30 0,20 
costly recovery (1.b.) 0,30 -0,050 
arbitrary recovery (1.c) 0,22 0,83 
Law: weak protection  (3.a) 0,51 0,51 
Law: weak enforcement (3.b.) 0,34 0,72 
Courts: lack of expertise (3.c.) 0,04 0 
Courts: corruption (3.d.) 0,67 0,40 
Courts: arbitrary judge (3.e.) 0,67 0,29 
bankruptcy time consuming 
(3.f.) 0,53 0,11 
Law: discriminatory (3.g.) 0,36 0,25 
Court: discriminatory (3.h.) 0,85 0,51 
Debtors  rarely qualify for 
rehab.(5.b.) 0,035 -0,22 
Rehab. time consuming (5.c.) 0,009 -0,51 
Much diversion (5.d.) -0,32 0,14 
Creditors weak in rehab. (5.e.) 0,046 0,16 
Debtors agree to work-outs (6.b.) -0,048 -0,32 
Creditors prefer work-outs (6.c.) -0,58 -0,66 
Bank reluctant to lend/i-rate does 
not compensate 1 0,36 
Higher int.rate spread than home 
country , because of inefficient 
insolvence procedure 0,36 1 
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Table 5.  Cross- firm Correlations for Croatia. (underlined questions were asked 
only in Croatia)  
     Parentheses refer to question 
numbers. Questions 5 and 6 do not 
apply, since Croatia does not have a 
rehabilitation law.   I.a.       I.b. 
 
Bank 
reluctant 
Higher int.rate 
spread 
.
. slow recovery  (1.a.) -0,11 -0,20 
 costly recovery (1.b.) 0,31 0,36 
 arbitrary recovery (1.c.) 0,14 0,27 
 Law: weak protection (3.a.) 0,42 0,56 
 Law: weak enforcement (3.b.) -0,32 -0,08 
 Courts: lack of expertise (3.c) 0,09 0,57 
 Courts: corruption (3.d.) 0,18 0,59+ 
 Courts: arbitrary judge (3.e.) 0,64+ 0,17 
 bankruptcy time consuming (3.f.) -0,44 0,20 
 Law: discriminatory (3.g.) 0,29 0,00 
 Court: discriminatory (3.h.) 0,29 0,00 
 
Bank supervisors often 
unprofessional  -0,07 0,00 
 Supervisors actions often arbitrary 0,05 -0,10 
 Croatian supervisors: more demands -0,48 0,34 
 
Croatian supervisors: specific 
demands -.0.41 0,86* 
 FX controls interfere with business -0,13 0,33 
 
Bank reluctant to lend/i-rate does 
not compensate 1 -0,10 
 
Higher int.rate spread than home 
country , because of inefficient 
insolvence procedure -0,10 1 
   
+ significant at 10% * significant at 5% 
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